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Abstract  
This paper constitutes the Master’s thesis of Fenia Mylonaki, as the final research attempt 
during the LL.M of Transnational, Commercial European Law, Mediation, Arbitration and Energy law. The 
thesis focuses on the comparison of the function of  the similar but not identical notions of EU State Aid and 
WTO subsidies, that along with Countervailing Measures and Anti-dumping measures have been of outmost 
significance for the deterrence of distortion of the market or market failure, either in the EU internal market or 
the markets of the states from the international trade perspective, as regulated by the WTO. These separate 
legal orders that have emerged and developed pursue similar but not identical purposes, as it is also reflected in 
the different substantive and procedural approaches regarding state aid and subsidies, an element that triggers 
the research interest of any student or scholar interested in the interaction between different legal orders. 
In this effort to analyse the various and complex issues, I would like to firstly thank Prof. 
Metaxas for introducing the LL.M class of 2014-2015 to the notions of State Aid and Prof. Papadopoulos for 
analysing and elaborating during the course of European Economic Law I into the necessary EU law 
background for the comprehension of State Aid law. However, I would like to sincerely thank the supervisor of 
this thesis, Prof. Pavlos Masouros, for his advice, support and comments on crucial legal points.  
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Introduction 
The comparative analysis of both the substantive and procedural framework between the two 
legal regimes is attempted, including the elaborate comparison between the regulated distortive 
behaviours of states and a vertical examination of the procedures and specific obligations in the 
enforcement stage. Such a comparison reveals interesting issues of the never ending question of the 
relation between EU law and WTO law. Also a practical interest as an interaction and convergence 
between the two systems could be considered in the future. In particular in the first chapter, one of the 
issues examined will be the existence of an element of 'financial contribution' and 'benefit' under the 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) that has been disputed by scholars and 
reveals more about the differences in the objectives and the role of the EU and WTO. The next chapter 
attempt the comparison in the context of the rest of the requirements of every legal order. Moreover, the 
different procedural approach between the two, i.e the ex ante and ex post procedural approaches will also 
be addressed.  
An issue of outmost significance is also interaction and potential convergence between the two 
regimes. Remarks will be made regarding the presence of legal effects of the WTO law in the narrower 
EU legal order, (since the EU is a signatory to the WTO) despite the absence of direct effect of the WTO 
law. The aforementioned systemic relationship between the EU and the WTO will also be addressed, and 
in particular the case of a measure subject to both legal systems where it is found legitimate in one but 
unlawful in the other. In particular, the possibility of avoiding prior notification in certain cases by 
broadening the exemptions’ spectrum constitute indications of such an interaction, following the more 
relaxed notification and enforcement procedure of the WTO. Thus, this paper will finally attempt to 
identify further points of potential convergence between the two legal systems from an economic analysis 
perspective. It should also be noted that subsidies under the disciplines of the WTO will be examined 
only in the context of the Agreement in Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) and not the 
Agreement on Agriculture and the.  
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A. ‘Financial Contribution’ requirement of WTO subsidies and the ‘State Resources’ requirement 
of EU State Aid. 
 
1. WTO Financial Contribution. Imputability to the State and Origins of the Resources 
 
In the context of the SCM Agreement, according to Article 1.1
1”definition of subsidy”, the 
notion of financial contribution constitutes the first of the three pillars whereby the definition of subsidy 
is established. As it was clarified in the US- Export restraints dispute, measures that merely had the effect 
of a financial contribution could not fall under Art. 1.1 SCM but had to be in nature actions of financial 
contribution. Thus, the exhaustive listing of the provision, clearly presents the basic structure of the 
notion that ensures that not all government measures that confer a benefit can constitute subsidies but 
solely the ones that make a financial contribution, focusing simultaneously on the fact that it is the nature 
of the action that is crucial in this methodology, rather than the effect of the measure. The first three cases 
of financial contribution of Art. 1.1(a), i.e, direct transfer of funds, foregone government revenue that was 
due and, finally, government purchase of goods, despite being quite broadly worded, permitting an 
expansive interpretation, do not leave any doubt that the imputability of the action rests on the State.  
However, it is the provision of Art. 1.1.(a)(iv) that calls for extra attention. It is the case where 
the State can direct or entrust a private party to contribute financially in the aforementioned manners. 
Thus, the subsidization is still conducted and is still imputable to the State but in a rather indirect and 
concealed manner. In the US- DRAMS dispute
2
, the Appellate Body provided the final interpretation for 
the terms ‘entrustment’ and ‘direction’ , as ‘action of giving responsibility’ and exercise of governmental 
authority’ respectively and broadened even more the Panel’s interpretation.  
Regarding the issue of ‘cost to the government’, contrary to what exists in the EU State Aid 
regime, the WTO has not set any corresponding requirement. In particular, following the rulings of the 
Panel and the Appellate Body at the Canada- Aircraft dispute, both bodies rejected Canada’s argument to 
include the cost to the government requirement in the definition of benefit. In a few words, they argued 
that in cases where a private body acted in ways of Art. 1.1(a) SCM under the government’s direction and 
                                                          
1
 “(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member 
(referred to in this Agreement as "government"), i.e. where: 
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, and equity infusion), potential direct 
transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g. loan guarantees); 
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g. fiscal incentives such as tax 
credits)1;(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods; 
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or 
more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and 
the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by 
governments; 
or(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994;”.  
2
 See US-DRAMS, par. 110-111 
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conferring a benefit, this situation could escape the definition of subsidy just because there was no ‘cost 
to the government’ but cost to a private party and circumvent the subsidy rules. Thus, the Panel and 
Appellate Body, via the notion of ‘benefit’ provided an answer to this long debated issue.  
 
2. The State Aid requirement of State resource 
 
i. Cost to the government- Public funds- The Preussen Elektra case 
 
The EU has extensively dealt with the issues of ‘cost to the government’ and imputability to 
the State bur in a different manner than the WTO, as an effect approach is clear. The position of the Court 
that was established in the Preussen Elektra case is crystallized. The basic principle for the interpretation 
of ‘any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever’ of Art. 107.1 
TFEU
3
  derives from cumulative interpretation, whereby aid granted by the State and aid granted through 
state resources are distinguished only in order to ‘bring in the definition of aid not only aid granted 
directly by the state, but also aid granted by public or private bodies designated or established by the 
state’.4 Thus, it reminds of the structure of Art. 1.1(a)(iv) SCM, in the sense that indirect actions are not 
left unregulated. However, it is evident that the EU wording is far more vague and unstructured, leaving 
vast space to teleological rather than textual interpretation. Consequently, in the Preussen Elektra, the 
Court stipulates that a burden on the State is indispensable requirement for the existence of State Aid, 
whereas private money that has been conveyed by the State’s intervention fall out of the scope of State 
Aid
5
. Thus, the aid can be granted either directly or indirectly but always through State resources.  
This interpretation has also been relevant in the cases where regulatory measures have been 
employed and have not been considered as State Aid, usually on the ground of absence of cost to the 
government or a cost that is In particular, measures of fiscal nature that cannot always be attributed to the 
State could be considered as Aid, if proven that they constitute efforts to circumvent the State Aid rules. 
The reasoning can be attributed to the Dassonville decision that firstly, all national provisions or 
regulatory measures that impede internal market trade directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, 
constitute a violation of the Treaty. However, it has been argued that regulatory measures that do not 
derive from state resources cannot be considered as State Aid, even if a specific undertaking is benefited
6
, 
if this benefit appears as inherent to the regulatory measure and serves a different policy. This was the 
                                                          
3
 Save as otherwise provided in the Treaties, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any 
form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the 
internal market. 
4
 See Steinicke und Weiling case, par. 19 ,Biondi, p. 1432, Koening, note 17 
5
 See Koening, Available at https://www.zei.uni-bonn.de/dateien/aufsaetze-und-fallbearbeitungen/130.pdf 
6
 See Sykes, The questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation, p. 488 
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reasoning of the Court in the cases of Sloman Neptun
7
, Viscido
8
 and Kirshammer-Hack
9
 that preceded the 
Preussen Electra and evolved the cumulative thesis. Nevertheless, Court’s adjudication in these cases has 
indeed been criticized, mainly on the ground of applying regulatory justifications on the definition of 
State Aid, whereas such a measure should not interfere with Art. 107 provision’s ratio, i.e, competition. 
Thus, the accurate and correct answer to the ‘cost to the government’ question seems to be 
found in the Ladbroke
10
 case and according to which State resources ‘constantly remain under to control 
of the State’.11 Thus, comparing the PreussenElektra and Essent the Court in the Association Vent De 
Colère  case that in the former distributors were obliged to buy green electricity using their “own 
financial resources” while in the latter distributors “managed a State resource”. [paragraph 35] 
“Consequently, the funds at issue [in PreussenElektra] could not be considered a State resource since 
they were not at any time under public control and there was no mechanism … established and regulated 
by the Member State, for offsetting the additional costs arising from that obligation to purchase and 
through which the State offered those private operators the certain prospect that the additional costs 
would be covered in full.” 12 
Thus, the previous analysis leads to the conclusion that there is a slight overlap between the 
‘cost to the government’ requirement and the imputability of the measure, meaning that maybe the correct 
question to be asked regarding the former requirement is not if the transfer confers a decrease on the 
budget of the State but if the resources were ‘directly or indirectly under the control or at the disposal of 
the State’.  
 
iii. The imputability of the action to the State- The Stardust Marine and Pearle cases 
First of all, it should be well established that the imputability can never be presumed merely 
on the public character of the measure or the mere control that is inherent. This indispensable element of 
public control is always examined thoroughly and in concreto. Instead, an active involvement and actual 
control of the State by means of proven exercise of public power is required, especially with regards to 
the decision making process and an impact on the internal market. These are the requirements for the 
regulatory measure to fall under EU law
13
, as it has also been held by the Court in the cases of the 
fundamental freedoms. The issue arose mainly during the Pearle
14
 case, where a public body was 
employed ‘as a vehicle for the levying and allocating of resources collected for a purely commercial 
                                                          
7
 See par. 21 
8
 See par. 15 
9
 See par. 17,18 
10
 Par 41 Opinion of Stardust case C-482/99 
11
 See par. 50, Air France T-358/94 par. 66-67, Stardust 37-8 
12
 Par. 36, See also Nicolaedis P. Available at http://stateaidhub.eu/blogs/stateaiduncovered/post/531   
13
 See Biondi p. 1443 
14
 C-345/02 
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purpose previously determined by the trade association’. However, the Court emphasized on the fact that 
the initiative for the measure was a private one and thus the imputability to the State was rejected, 
whereas, it should have only constituted one of the factors to be considered
15
. 
The test introduced by the Stardust Marine decision includes a non-exhaustive listing of 
factors that the Court needs to take into consideration in order to deem upon the concrete involvement of 
the State in the measure of the public body. This list includes inter alia the capacity of the body to decide 
upon the implementation of the measure with or without the intervention of the state, the degree of 
control the State upon the body or the intermediary via which the aid was granted. Thus, this same test 
could also apply to cases where private monies are utilized and questions of State Aid arise
16
. Despite the 
Preussen Elektra and related jurisprudence of the Court, such cases can be imputable to the State and be 
considered as State Aid. It may appear as a prima facie violation of what seems to have evolved into a 
well-established jurisprudence, however, a doctrinal rejection of the existence of State Aid just on the 
ground that there is no cost to the government, would constitute an ideal environment for governments 
and undertakings to circumvent the State Aid disciplines by employing private funds. 
 
3. Conclusions- Comparative Remarks  
 
The differences of the disciplines especially regarding the ‘cost to the government’ 
requirement could constitute the main differentiated point and ground for conflict between the two legal 
orders. Regarding imputability to the State, both legal orders have pointed out the need to focus on the 
efforts to deter circumventions from the States, whereas, the WTO wording of Art. 1.1(a)(iv) seems far 
more concrete and specific, increasing therefore the potential to fulfill this purpose, in comparison to Art. 
107 TFEU. As a general comment though, the ‘cost to government’ requirement that exists in the State 
Aid regime in the form of ‘charge on the public account’ seems to be transformed into the ‘public control 
on the resources’ requirement.  Thus, it seems to converge to the SCM discipline, where no ‘cost to the 
government’ requirement exists but rather the question of ‘financial contribution’ is interpreted and 
answered holistically via the imputability analysis.   
In this context, there could be a case that a measure not conferring a cost to the government, 
and thus not be considered as State Aid, be indeed considered as a WTO subsidy and a ground for conflict 
between these two disciplines could arise, although no such case has so far been recorded. However, in 
cases such as Ladbroke Racing
17
 and the Stardust Marine case, the implication of private parties by the 
government was also accepted as attributing imputability to the State and thus, converged to the WTO 
                                                          
15
 See Biondi 1445 
16
 Case C83/98 P- France v. Ladbroke Racing and Commission (2000), par.50 
  
17
 Case C83/98 P- France v. Ladbroke Racing and Commission (2000), par.50 
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regime, whereas regarding state owned or state controlled undertakings are in both cases considered as 
part of the government for the purposes of this analysis.  
 
 
B. The Advantage and Benefit Analysis- A Common Ground  
 
In the WTO legal order, the SCM Agreement in Art.1.1(b), expressly requires a benefit for the 
existence of a subsidy. However, the provision is limited to this sentence and therefore, the dispute 
resolution bodies of the WTO have interpreted this requirement. The milestone case is the Canada- 
Aircraft, which held that the benefit analysis actually consists of the comparison where the benchmark is 
–almost- always the market. In particular, the decision held that there was indeed a benefit conferred to 
the recipient of a ‘financial contribution’, if the latter was better off than it would otherwise have been, 
absent that contribution. Thus, according to the Appellate Body, ‘the appropriate basis for comparison in 
determining whether a benefit has been conferred … whether the recipient has received a ‘financial 
contribution’ on terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the market.’ 18 The crucial 
element of this context is the phrase ‘what would otherwise have been’ and ‘in the market’. Specifically, 
the essence of the issue lies with the interpretation of ‘otherwise’, as it is the element that reveals the 
actual point of comparison and the market is the basis of comparison. Thus, the notion of the norm or 
normality arises in the context of a market, concluding that the advantage can only be regarded as the 
derogation from this norm that takes the form of an economic advantage or benefit.
19
 
 
The exact same methodological standard is encountered in the EU legal order, where even 
since the notion of normality versus derogation was introduced in the State Aid advantage analysis. 
Commencing from Art. 107 TFEU (87 EC), the requirement of advantage cannot be regarded as more 
eloquently worded than in Art. 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, as it requires ‘favouring certain 
undertakings or the production of certain goods’. However, the interpretation provided by the 
aforementioned case and the Opinions in the cases of Germany v. Commission, the Hytasa case and 
finally, the SFEI case, have led to the normal market conditions requirement that beyond any doubt 
prioritize the notion of normality. According to Rubini
20
, this common ground can be described as the 
‘derogation test’, as its objective is to identify the derogations from the norm, i.e the advantage itself. The 
other test that has been employed, mostly, according to Rubini, for the purposes of finding the appropriate 
                                                          
18
 Appellate Body, par. 157 
19
 See Rubini, p. 118 
20
 Rubini, p. 206-207 
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benchmark
21
, does not seek directly for the derogation from the normality but rather attempts to compare 
alike situations under the light of the objective of the measure. As it has been eloquently put in the Adria-
Wien case, in order to have State Aid, the measure imposed needs to favor certain undertaking ‘in 
comparison with other undertakings which are in a legal and factual situation that is comparable in the 
light of the objective pursued by the measure in question’22 mainly in cases of tax measures focuses on the 
comparison of ‘the fiscal treatment of legitimately comparable income’23. Thus, it has been considered 
that those two tests are actually the same one and reflect the two different notions that according to both 
the DSB of the WTO and the Court, need to be established in order to have a subsidy or a State Aid.  
However, due to the complexity of the business management and the cases of State Aid and 
subsidization that have come up, more accurate comparison tests have been developed and are directed to 
examine certain factual contexts, where state intervention takes the form of a public investment in an 
undertaking, as in cases of capital injections of granting of loans by the government. Thus, market 
principles are employed in order to assess the behavior of public entrepreneurs and conclude on the 
existence or absence of an advantage. In this context, the Market Economy Investor Principle stipulates 
that there is no advantage when the terms and conditions of a public investment would be acceptable to a 
private investor operating under normal market economy conditions
24
. The corresponding test can set 
various sub-benchmarks depending on the investment. This flexibility is evident also from the fact that 
the most effective form of the test comprises not just by the question of whether, under the same normal 
economy circumstances, a private investor would choose to enter the transaction that the public investor 
has entered via the investment 
25
 but also whether there is actually a private investor participation
26. “In 
principle, a contribution from public funds does not involve state aid if it takes place at the same time as a 
significant capital contribution by a private investor made in comparable circumstances and on 
comparable terms (pari passu). In addition, irrespective of pari passu reasoning, a measure can fulfil the 
MEIP test if it can be demonstrated that a private investor in the same position as the public investor and 
facing a similar set of circumstances, would have provided the capital contribution on similar terms and 
conditions.”27 
However, the notion of the comparison between the public investor and the private investor 
was not a privilege of the EC. In the EC-DRAMS dispute, the private market player benchmark was also 
employed and a principle almost identical to the MEIP arose. According to the Panel ‘‘if the public or 
                                                          
21
 Rubini, p. 207 
22
 Adria-Wien, par. 41 
23
 See also US-FSC, 21(5), par. 90-91 
24
 Slocock, p. 23 
25
 Nicolaides, Market Economy Investor Principle, available at  
http://stateaidhub.eu/blogs/stateaiduncovered/post/4185 
26
 Slocock, p. 24 
27
 Commission decision, par. 44, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/258693/258693_1686915_85_4.pdf. 
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publicly directed financial contribution is provided under the same conditions as a private market player 
would have provided, then there would be no reason to impose any discipline, simply because the 
financial contribution was provided by the government’. Moreover, in Article 14(a)-(d) guidelines that 
expressly provide for different tests depending on the case at issue, i.e, equity capital injunctions, the 
grant of loan, loan guarantee and provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government. 
All four cases constitute specific benefit tests that employ market benchmarks comparing the public 
investor to the private investor (‘usual investment practice’). According to Canada- Aircraft, that 
provision although not stipulated for that purpose, actually provides an interpretation of the benefit 
analysis in the WTO framework.
28
 
However, a significant point of differentiation that should be noted is the occasional absence 
of the requirement of a benefit in the WTO framework. This is the case of prohibited export subsidies that 
are considered by definition advantageous and therefore cannot constitute a ground for interpretation of 
the benefit requirement
29
.Consequently, it is a significant remark that the two legal orders follow almost 
identical paths on the basic methodology.  
 
1. Methodological Challenges 
 
iii. The choice of the appropriate benchmark 
 
What appears to be a quite complex issue capable of distorting in total the advantage analysis 
and resulting in controversial outcomes is the choice of the appropriate benchmark. The most commonly 
employed benchmark is that of the marketplace, whereas in cases of the State’s non- economic activity, 
internal benchmarks have been employed.  In the WTO context, the marketplace benchmark was firstly 
introduced in the Canada-Aircraft dispute as the most appropriate basis for comparison, capable to show 
if the terms of financing were equally favourable. Today, the market benchmarks are characterized in 
both legal orders by flexibility and there have been cases of other market benchmarks apart from prices, 
i.e costs. The benchmarks identified in the tests of Art. 14 resemble a lot to the ones employed by the 
MEIP test, as the ‘usual investment practice’ 
Recalling the MEIP
30
, the choice of the appropriate benchmarks seems again relevant, while 
the complexity is again confirmed. It seems that the test encompasses two different but also related 
benchmarks. In particular, in joined cases T-319/12 and T-321/12, Spain v Commission, the Court held 
that the case law requires is only ‘a consideration whether it would be economically rational for a private 
                                                          
28
 Canada-Arcraft, Panel Report, par. 9.113. Appellate Body Repor, par. 155-158. See Also Ehlermann, p. 700 
29
 See Ehleremman, p 700, Canada- Aircraft Panel Report, par. 9.117 
30
 See Slocock, p. 24 
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investor to commit his money in the particular project’ 31 and not necessarily the highest return for the 
benchmark private investor. In addition to that, it needs to be clarified that the comparison of a private 
investor’s behavior with a public investor’s behavior needs to be based on the criteria of long-term profit 
and structural policy. As quoted, ‘the relevant benchmark of behaviour must be that of a private holding 
company pursuing a structural policy and is guided by prospects of profitability in the longer term
’32
. 
Thus, even in the context of a single benchmark the corresponding economic analysis is extremely 
complex and can lead to completely different outcomes, if not properly conducted. 
Another interesting and relevant issue is the question of benchmark choice in cases of market absence, 
such as the Canada-Renewable Energy/FiT, where the Panel and Appellate Body, influenced by the ECJ 
jurisprudence but adapted the logic of SGEIs and POSs in the WTO. In particular, in the Canada FiT case 
there has been a market definition and indeed a too narrow one, including only the renewable energy 
market, whereas benchmarks similar to the ones of the State Aid regime, such price discovery 
mechanisms and public procurement elements has been applied and interpreted quite broadly. Thus, the 
choice of the benchmark was tailor-made in a way that would exclude the existence of a subsidy
33
 and 
simultaneous provides an example of interaction between the two legal orders.  
Thus, it should be noted that in the WTO framework, a benefit cannot be considered as 
conferred in case the government or public body’s resources are the same price or analogous to the ones 
of competing private suppliers.  
 
iv. The systemic position of public policy considerations in the advantage analysis 
 
The recent decision of the Appellate Body in the Canada-Renewable Energy/FiT case has 
given rise to more discussion in the context of the benefit analysis in the WTO context, especially 
regarding the introduction of public policy considerations into that stage of the subsidy methodology. The 
innovation of the Altmark case that constitutes the milestone for the advantage analysis of SGEI is that it 
has managed to create a solid test and enhance legal certainty. The Altmark criteria are employed at the 
stage of the advantage analysis, as their purpose is actually to establish that the compensation received by 
the undertaking is the necessary one, as there would be an advantage conferred insofar as the amount 
exceeds the necessary remuneration, i.e, the market price. In particular, a market is technically created. In 
this market, the prevention of conferring an advantage to the service provider is safeguarded by public 
tender and procurement procedures, as the market price that derives from those procedures covers the cost 
                                                          
31
Nicolaides, Benchmarks of Profitability for Market Investors, available at 
http://stateaidhub.eu/blogs/stateaiduncovered/post/27 
32
 WestLB, T-228/99; Belgium v Commission, C-142/87; Italy v Commission, C-305/89; Cityflyer Express v 
Commission, T-16/96. 
33
 See Rubini, ‘The wide and the narrow gate’. Benchmarking in the SCM Agreement after the Canada – 
Renewable Energy/FIT ruling p. 8 
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of the service and a profit margin. However, these cases constitute an exception that in any case cannot be 
reflected in the WTO regime, as the latter does not recognize any policy infiltrating the subsidy analysis, 
especially since the abandonment of non-actionable subsidies. 
 
2. Conclusions 
 
The examination of the advantage and benefit analysis has led us to certain conclusions, among which 
the most crucial is the necessity of separating any public policy considerations from the advantage 
analysis, as in both legal orders, the latter is systemically put in the justification analysis or the actionable 
subsidies discipline, that is now void. Moreover, both legal orders have established similar tests and 
benchmarks for the comparison that constitutes the advantage analysis and therefore, only certain and 
technical differences arise on these matters. However, a crucial point of differentiation lies on the 
existence of a specific category of subsidies, i.e, the prohibited export subsidies, that do not require a 
benefit to be conferred. The latter is rather implied or considered as inherent to the notion of those 
subsidies.   
 
C. Specificity and Selectivity tests.  
 
Concluding the advantage analysis, the next question that needs to be answered in the 
course of the methodology is the person(s), natural or legal that are conferred this advantage. Thus 
appropriate question, is which economic factor(s) are conferred an economic advantage from the 
subsidization
34
. 
In the WTO framework, the specificity requirement for the existence of a subsidy is expressly provided in 
Article 2 SCM Agreement. It should be noted that this is the case of subsidies where specificity is not 
presumed. Consequently, prohibited export subsidies of Article 3 SCM are not subject to the following 
test elaborated below, as they are considered specific by definition. Thus, the requirement of De jure or 
de facto specificity needs to be fulfilled, in order for the subsidy to be considered as an actionable one and 
for that reason, an elaborate three-stage test is employed.  
According to the test, de jure specificity needs to be examined first, i.e whether certain 
economic actors are expressly addressed to as beneficiaries. It should be noted, that the wording of the 
provision mentions the specific groups to which the subsidy is granted, whereas, nowhere in the SCM 
agreement has there been an analysis or definition of the ‘groups’. As a consequence, the results of this 
exercise are rather unpredictable creating uncertainty. If no beneficiaries are expressly mentioned, the 
                                                          
34
 Rubini, p. 336 
15 
 
second stage follows, where one needs to seek for any objective criteria or a discretional basis. Thus, in 
case the legislation providing for the granting of the subsidy does not restrict it to certain recipients- 
especially be excluding others- and the criteria of its granting are objective and neutral, resembling the 
public procurement procedures, then the requirement of specificity is not fulfilled. However, even if a 
measure is indeed based on objective criteria, the examination of de facto specificity should follow in any 
case. Specifically, what needs to be tested at this stage of the analysis is whether this measure is de facto 
capable to provide an advantage to specific economic actors. This is usually the case where the subsidy is 
either used by only a limited and certain number of undertakings or that the amounts granted are  
“disproportionately large” or where there is a territorial element, i.e, certain undertakings of a certain area 
or jurisdiction are granted such amounts. Nevertheless, there have not been many WTO disputes that 
could bring up interpretative issues, and therefore these theoretical constructions do not seem to be quite 
tested in practice
35
.  
In the EU legal order, selectivity is the notion that distinguishes State Aid to general 
measures, i.e, those that apply to all firms in all economic sectors in a State. However, even those 
measures can be considered as selective if the granting authority enjoys wide discretion, as interpreted by 
the Court
36. Thus, it should also be noted that the term ‘certain’ is not intended to be related necessarily to 
the number of the undertakings benefited but rather takes the meanings of ‘certain instead of others’, as 
opposed to measures of general application. The distinction between de jure and de facto selectivity is 
evident also in the State Aid law disciplines, as the absence of a legislation that grants a State Aid to 
specific undertakings is not the only case where selectivity could occur. There have been cases where 
selectivity was affirmed, when measures seemingly were addressed to a broad spectrum of undertakings 
and under seemingly objective conditions but in reality, the measures where actually meant to be fulfilled 
only by very specific undertakings. Thus, despite the absence of a separate test, interpretatively, the two 
disciplines seem to be quite similar, as for example subsidies for all exports
37
 have been indeed 
considered as specific, even though they are granted on a large number of undertakings.  
However, certain differentiations have been observed, as in the case of regional aid
38
 or the 
SMEs. Regarding regional aid, the WTO keeps a looser stance, as Art. 2.2 SCM is interpreted as meaning 
that if a ‘subsidy granted by to all enterprises in a certain region is not specific’.39 On the contrary, the 
EU legal order is quite strict as it considers that aid granted only to certain areas of the State cannot be 
considered as a general measure, if it cannot be justified. The basis for justification is firstly the exercise 
of autonomous power by the local authorities in relation to the central authorities. This conclusion needs 
to be examined under three questions, i.e, firstly, if administratively and politically, this local authority is 
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indeed independent from the central government, Secondly, whether the central government has the 
power to intervene in the local authority’s decision and thirdly, whether this economic advantage is offset 
by the government.
40
  
The case of the SMEs is also an interesting ground of comparison between the two legal 
orders. In the WTO framework the SMEs are considered as not fulfilling the specificity requirement, 
when the objective and non-discretional criteria are applied, according to Art. 2.1(b) SCM, where the 
objective criteria where the number of employees and the size of the undertaking. However, in the EC 
framework, the same question was dealt with at the Spain v. Commission case, where one of the 
arguments was indeed that under WTO law, aid to SMEs are not considered as specific. The Court 
rigorously rejected the argument and held that the fact that the measure would not be considered as 
specific under the  SCM Agreement, does not mean that It should be so deemed under EU law too.
41
 
 
 
1. Direct and Indirect Beneficiaries 
 
The issue of direct and indirect specificity appears to be extremely complex and constantly 
evolving and therefore, it will be briefly addressed. As Rubini has pointed out, there are two cases where 
indirect selectivity exists and thus, subsidization exists. These cases are the ‘upstream’ or ‘input’ 
subsidies and the sale of the company granted the subsidy or its assets. 
In the ‘input’ subsidies scenario the benefit is conferred to the producer of the input 
product that is later to be further processed by a different undertaking. Thus, the question arises, whether 
this benefit conferred to the economic actor at a previous stage of production is passed through to the next 
stages and could be considered as conferred to the following economic actors. Consequently, it seems that 
the question could be put differently, i.e, whether the benefit is actually conferred to the product itself. 
The GATT (WTO) had firstly dealt with the issue at the US-Pork dispute
42
, where it could 
not be established that the benefit of subsidies to swine breeders was downstream passed through, as a 
price decrease of pork could not be established. Later on, at the US-Softwood Lumber III
43
 and US-
Softwood Lumber IV it was held that no presumptions of the passing through of a benefit should be 
accepted, due to the quite complex scheme under which benefit is usually transmitted and that arm’s 
length transactions in arm’s length prices can be regarding as a means of benefit passing through only 
after if it can indeed be proven.
44
 The same logic applies more or less regarding the issue of 
privatizations, sale of the business or sale of its assets. In particular, the milestone case in this context is 
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the US- Lead and Bismurth II, where again no irrebuttable presumptions can exist regarding the passing 
through of the benefit to the new owner but rather, such a case needs to be examined thoroughly
45
. 
Moreover, it was held by the Panel that if the new owner has paid a fair market value in an arm’s hand 
transaction and has therefore acted according to ‘commercial considerations’ then the new owner has not 
been conferred a benefit. The same conclusion was reached in the SMI case by the Court.
46
 Accordingly, 
in cases of asset deals, the benefit of the buyer is excluded. On the contrary, in cases of business deals, the 
buyer could be held liable to repay unlawful aid, as he has also taken the business liabilities. 
 
2. Conclusions  
 
Despite the quasi-identical logic in the general methodology, the two disciplines differ on 
certain key points. In particular, as already mentioned, in State Aid law, there is no express provision 
presuming that in certain cases selectivity is found by definition, apart from certain arguments that export 
subsidization is also considered by definition as specific. Also, regional aid is generally found to be State 
Aid under EU law but in the WTO this issue is dealt differently. Along with regional aid, the question of 
the SMEs has pointed out the different approaches of the two legal orders and in particular the broader 
and stricter scope of the notion under EU law. However, interaction has indeed occurred as export 
subsidization selectivity is the same as in the WTO regime, whereas the latter has also considered in 
certain cases of regional subsidies as specific.  
 
 
 
D. The distortion of Competition and effect on trade in EU law 
 
There have been four types of competition distortions that State Aid can cause. In 
particular, the support of inefficient production, the distortion of dynamic incentives and the increase of 
market power all constitute factors that support the argument that state aid can distort competition. 
Moreover, it distorts the unofficial competition between governments to attract investments.  This 
perception of distortion of competition includes all possible scenarios that could arise either in the EU or 
WTO regime. 
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The notion of distortion of competition in EU State Aid law has been interpreted quite vastly, 
as provided by the benchmark case of Philip Morris,
47
 in order to confirm the existence of a distortion 
there needs to be evident that the undertaking benefited has strengthened its financial position in the 
market. However, even if intra community trade is not existent, the requirement can be fulfilled in case 
the subsidized products compete on their home market with imports from other Member States. However, 
neither the Advocate General’s Opinion nor the decision appear to analyze in detail and elaborate on the 
methodology. On the contrary, the wording of the decision reveals that the true intention of the Court is to 
automatically confer the distortion of competition and effect on trade when there is an advantage. In 
particular, it actually appears to match those notions, as it is inferred that the distortion of competition and 
effect on trade is analogous to the empowerment of the receiver’s position in the market48. Thus, it seems 
to skip the step of examining whether there is indeed a distortion of competition or not and rather 
considers as granted the fact that there is a distortion. Interestingly enough, this perception of state aid as 
a scheme automatically distorting competition and intra EU trade has also been held in cases where the 
receiver of the aid had been the single undertaking manufacturing a certain product. Even in the absence 
of competition the distortion of competition was confirmed, as it was considered as affecting intra 
community trade, without providing any solid argumentation
49
. Thus, as it has been steadily held both by 
the Commission and the Court that the granting of an aid is per se distorting competition and affecting 
trade, without requiring any further examination either of the relevant market or any other parameter.
50
 In 
the same applies to the effect on trade that appears to be also considered as dogmatically a natural 
consequence of the granting of an aid.  
The most significant presumption employed in this context is the de minimis rule
51
, whose 
function focuses on the exclusion of less significant aid from the State Aid provisions and it appears to 
apply to both the distortion of competition and the effect on intra community trade. Thus, if the amount 
granted as aid to an undertaking is below a specific threshold, then it is considered that the distortion on 
competition and the effect on trade in EU law is not significant and therefore, the provisions of state aid 
are non-applicable in the specific case. Despite the fact that this presumption has been legislatively 
introduced, the case law does not seem to have adopted it.
52
  Keeping in mind the Court’s rulings that the 
granting of any aid always constitutes a distortion of competition and have an effect on trade, the issue of 
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the de minimis rule is attributed a special role, as it constitutes in effect a justification of State Aid but is 
actually introduced in the stage of the examination of the existence of State Aid. Thus, it appears to be 
quasi-paradoxical, as on one hand, case law and legislation treat the issue of distortion of competition and 
effect on trade as automatically present in every granting of aid and on the other hand, it is arbitrarily 
stipulated that aid granted below a certain threshold is not State Aid. Thus, an element that is considered 
on one hand inherent to the notion of State Aid is simultaneously considered not existent on a quantitative 
basis. This way, it appears that the qualitative criterion is exterminated by an arbitrary quantitative 
criterion. Taking also into consideration that the de minimis rule is applicable simultaneously to the effect 
on trade criterion, the aforementioned observation renders the issue even more problematic, especially 
since it constitutes a matter with significant extensions to the procedural law of state aids. Thus, there is 
an inconsistency in the treatment of the distortion of competition and effect on trade criterion.   
 
1. The structure of WTO Subsidy system in terms of effect on trade  
 
The WTO system also provides considerations regarding the effect on trade and specifically, 
an adverse effect on trade is required, except from the cases of prohibited subsidies. According to Art. 3 
of the SCM Agreement
53
, the red light subsidies are specifically the export subsidies, excluding the ones 
that are permitted by the Agreement on Agriculture and the import substitution subsidies, i.e, subsidies 
that are granted under the condition of utilizing solely or mainly domestic products instead of imported 
products. The aforementioned subsidies are specific by definition and generically are considered as 
having an adverse effect on trade, since they have been designed to reward exports or to enhance the 
choice of domestic over imported and thus, to impede trade. It should be reminded that these subsidies are 
either de jure or de facto prohibited, meaning that they do not need to be legally or in fact contingent on 
export performance, whereas subsidies granted to undertakings with export activity do not in principle 
qualify to be considered as prohibited subsidies.
54
  
The yellow light subsidies are the ones that are usually referred to as “actionable subsidies” 
and described in Part III. These subsidies need to be proven as both specific and having an adverse effect 
on trade between the WTO member states, according to article 5 of the SCM agreement. In particular, in 
the adverse effect on trade exists where there is (a) an injury to the domestic industry; (b) nullification or 
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impairment of benefits (c) serious prejudice to the interests of another Member. In particular the serious 
prejudice standard is elaborated in Article 6
55.  
Regarding the main issue of the adverse effect on trade, the systemic position of the provisions 
indicate that the examination of the existence of an injury commence by examining if the subsidy confers 
any of the consequences of Art. 5. Contrary to the TFEU, the SCM Agreement, analyzes the notion of 
injury in Art. 15. However, the extremely technical approach seems to intend to narrow down the scope 
of the definition, rather than just providing for the methodology for the existence of an injury. In 
particular, it is perceived that the injury is mainly in relation to prices, whether it is possible that cases 
including other distortive issues and in particular, where the issue is much more complex and the industry 
is injured in non directly financial manners. 
56
  
However, a little more elaborate analysis is an order regarding the interesting and significance 
notion of prejudice. Article 6 appears to be quite analytical and inclusive, therefore it should be 
considered as a model for the display of the appropriate methodology, terminology and accuracy for the 
demanding task of assessing a multileveled economic phenomenon. In order to fulfill this purpose, it 
provides indicative criteria that could be considered as indicators for the existence of a severe prejudice. 
Nevertheless, it uses submissive language, such as ‘may arise..’, rendering the whole article a complex 
presumption. Indeed, even if one of the aforementioned cases is met, then there could be a serious 
prejudice. Nevertheless, the next paragraph sets another factor, i.e, that this presumption is indeed 
rebuttable, as it could be equally proven that the subsidy did not confer any of the aforementioned results. 
That is the case where a subsidy is merely compensating a disadvantage and it would most probably 
result in a no-negative-effects assessment. However, residual negative effects may be taken into account 
when the positive impact of the subsidy is assessed and can be set off at the justification stage. In the 
same context, a closer look on the most significant relevant cases, such as Indonesia- Automobile 
Industry
57
, would show that what is of outmost significance in the case of prejudice is the existence of 
‘positive evidence’, as the justification provided in par.2 renders the assessment a much more demanding 
task than the corresponding one of EU law, where it is almost automatically considered that there is a 
distortion of competition and effect on trade. 
The green (non-actionable) subsidies constituted an experiment, as they were introduced and 
had a temporary character, as of limited duration. In particular, they were a category of subsidies that 
even if found to be specific, they would not be considered as actionable, as they fulfilled a specific 
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purpose of high significance for the granting state and for general welfare. In particular, the green 
subsidies were those whose aim was research and development, assistance to disadvantaged regions and 
compliance with environmental regulations. Those three categories were exempted from the imposition of 
countervailing measures or complaint by a WTO member for the removal of the subsidy or any other 
consequence their characterization as actionable would confer
58
.   
A final remark should be made, on the catalytic requirement for the existence of causality 
between subsidy and adverse effects that it is expressly requested by the WTO regime. According to 
Article 11 SCM, in order for the existence of a subsidy to be affirmed, a casual link between the 
subsidization, injury and casual link needs to be established. Despite the fact that this requirement is only 
mentioned in Article 11 and does not appear in the definition of the subsidy, it needs to be considered as a 
conditio sine qua non in terms of methodology for the affirmation of the existence of a subsidy and the 
commencement of an investigation and enforcement action. This requirement is quite strict and needs to 
be established on substantive evidence, according to Article 11 (15),(5) of the SCM Agreement.  
 
2. Conclusion 
 
The two legal orders seem to follow similar paths in terms of substance but differ in terms of format. 
As the TFEU’s wording is restricted to two phrases and relatively limited case law, the SCM agreement 
appears as much more elaborate but yet, incomplete and confusing. Nevertheless,  
 
 
E. Compatibility, Justifications in EU and WTO law 
 
Regarding compatibility, EU law has developed an elaborate system of justifications that comprise of 
multiple legislative acts and case law, deriving mostly from the objectives of the Union. However, such a 
system is not encountered in the WTO regime, where the non-actionable subsidies have been eliminated 
since 2000.
59
   
 
1. State Aid law 
 
i. GBER 
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The issue of the compatibility of State Aid with the internal market has been an issue proven 
to be of pivotal significance, as it is the member states’ final resort to avoid a potential adverse procedural 
outcome of a Commission investigation on the aid. In particular, on this basis, of Article 107 (2), (3)  
there are certain categories of aid that although qualifying as State aid, are not considered incompatible 
aid and  therefore, evade the application of EU State Aid law. Thus, the Council has authorized the 
Commission to adopt legislation that declares certain types of aid and under specific conditions, as 
compatible to EU law. Under this authorization the new General Block Exemption Regulation (GBER) 
Commission Regulation (EU) N°651/2014 of 17 June 2014 60 was adopted. It consolidates the exemptions 
existing in the former different and multiple Regulations. Its main aspect is that it includes more 
categories of state aid considered compatible under Article 107 § 3 TFEU. The function of the the GBER 
is that it provides automatic approval by the Commission for aid concerning issues that are sensitive to 
the EU, such as SMEs development, research, innovation, regional development, training, employment 
and risk capital environmental protection aid, aid measures promoting entrepreneurship, such as aid for 
young innovative businesses and regional aid, in order to boost competitiveness. However, it should be 
noted that the Regulation is not applicable to fisheries and aquaculture, agriculture and coal. The 
significance of this legislation is evident, as it has managed to simplify the procedures in State Aid law 
and providing for a broader potential for growth in the EU internal market, as the procedural requirements 
of prior notification and Commission authorization are not necessary under certain conditions.  
 
ii. SGEI (Altmark, Decision, Framework) Services of General Economic Interest [106(2)] 
 
Another issue that has been crucial for EU legislators and Courts is the treatment under EU 
State Aid law of the amounts received as compensation for discharge of public obligation services, where 
actual cost recovery has been the main point of dispute. A quasi- definition of Services of General 
Economic Interest is provided in the Commission’s Quality Framework stipulating that SGEIs are 
economic activities which deliver outcomes in the overall public good that would not be supplied (or 
would be supplied under different conditions in terms of objective quality, safety, affordability, equal 
treatment or universal access) by the market without public intervention. Similarly, a Public Service 
Obligation is imposed on the provider by way of an entrustment and on the basis of a general interest 
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criterion which ensures that the service is provided under conditions allowing it to fulfil its mission.
 61
 
The methodology of cases involving Public Service Obligation and SGEI requires as a first step to be the 
examination of the basic qualification for state aid criteria. The Altmark criteria follow and if non of the 
above are met, then the de minimis Regulation’s criteria are checked62. 
The milestone case that changed radically the scenery of compatibility of State Aid is the 
Altmark
63
, case, where the Court of Justice introduced the four cumulative criteria that needed to be met 
in order for a public service compensation to not constitute State Aid within the meaning of Article 107 
TFEU. In particular, the four conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for the remuneration of the 
undertaking to be considered as a mere compensation and not State Aid are the following: the first 
criterion of the Altmark test that requires the recipient company to having undertaken clearly and 
accurately defined public service obligations stipulating in detail all relevant rights, obligations, aspects 
and costs of the operation. The second criterion requires that the factors on which the calculation of the 
compensation is based have been set beforehand in an objective and transparent manner. A was attributed 
that specific service of general economic interest and is entitled to receive a fixed remuneration as a 
compensation that covers solely its costs for the execution of these services plus a reasonable margin of 
profit. Thus, if the method of calculation is based on an objective criterion, and has been determined 
transparently the second criterion is also fulfilled.  According to the third criterion, the compensation 
received should not exceed the amount necessary to cover entirely or partially the costs incurred in 
fulfilling the public service obligations, taking into consideration the revenues and a reasonable profit. In 
other words, prices need to correspond to the fixed and predetermined remuneration that slightly exceeds 
the cost of production. Lastly, according to the fourth criterion, if the company that has undertaken the 
PSO has not been selected in a public procurement procedure, the amount of compensation should have 
been based on the cost assessment of the typical, well-functioning and adequately provided with 
necessary means so as to be able to meet the public service requirements, for the execution of the 
undertaken task, taking into consideration all receipts and reasonable profit for discharging the 
obligations. Naturally, the entrusted undertaking needs to be industrially efficient and well organized. 
This is the most controversial criterion. The criterion of the well-running and functional undertaking 
seems quite vague, since cost analysis in similar undertakings is rarely provided for or made public. Thus, 
such an assessment would be quite difficult to be conducted. However, in case the final Altmark criterion 
is not found as fulfilled, which is the most likely case, an advantage seems to be existent and 
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incompatible State Aid cannot be excluded. However, even if one of the Altmark criteria is not met, while 
the rest of the State Aid requirements are met, the compensation received for the discharge of the public 
service constitutes State Aid. Nevertheless,  the examination of the compensation under Article 106 
TFEU may prove it to be compatible under the instruments of the SGEI package, and thus, exempted 
from notification under the Decision or approved by the Commission upon notification on the basis of the 
Framework.
64
 
The State Aid SGEI package consists of four instruments, namely, the Communication, the 
de minimis Regulation
65
, the Decision
66
 and the Framework
67
. The SGEI de minimis Regulation is quite 
significant in this context, as it provides that SGEI compensation not exceeding EUR 500 000 over any 
period of three fiscal years does not fall under State Aid scrutiny. The general de minimis Regulation 
(Regulation 1998/2006)
68
 provides that aid measures not exceeding EUR 200 000 over any period of 
three fiscal years per undertaking are outside the notion of aid (Article 107(1) TFEU) because they are 
deemed not to affect trade between Member States and/or not to distort or threaten to distort competition 
and is applicable in all cases, as it is the general de minimis presumption analyzed in the previous chapter. 
The SGEI de minimis Regulation provides for a higher threshold (EUR 500 000 over a period of three 
fiscal years per undertaking) for measures in the context of an SGEI
69
. At a later stage and if the aid 
exceeds the de minimis threshold, The revised Decision exempts Member States from the notification 
obligation, under certain conditions, whereas the Framework provides for the rest of the cases, namely 
for the ones not exempted from the notification obligation by the Decision. Those cases have to be 
notified to the Commission but could be found finally compatible. In this context, it is more than evident 
that state aid justifications in the EU legal order has developed into an elaborate system, where depending 
on the objective, the nature of the aid as a compensation and the amount granted in the latter case, have 
evolved into the main pillars of the discipline that can have an effective impact on the internal market and 
the economic and social evolution of the EU.  
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2. WTO  
 
In principle, the WTO does not provide for justifications or policy related exceptions for 
subsidies, although certain justifications under quantitative and objective criteria relating to the subsidy 
itself, as it is the case of the EU aid regime. On the contrary, certain special and differential treatment in 
favor of the least developed contracting parties has been established and is significantly more lenient in 
terms of the granting of export and actionable subsidies. In particular, Art. 27 of the SCM Agreement 
stipulates the condition under which this quasi justification of de minimis nature is applicable. The issue is 
not interesting merely from a substantial law point of view but has rather interesting procedural 
extensions that are going to be further analyzed in the following Chapter.  
 
i. The issue of non-actionable subsidies  
 
The SCM-Agreement of 1994 provided for a third category of subsidy, apart from prohibited and 
actionable subsidies. The third category, namely the ‘Non-actionable subsidies’ was not subject to 
challenge, and had the objective of supporting ‘assistance for research activities conducted by firms or by 
higher education or research establishments on a contract basis with firms’;. However, as of 2000 the 
WTO did not prolong the expiring provision of non-actionable subsidies, resulting in their abandonment 
and the absolute absence of any relevant provision in the WTO framework
70
.  Thus, there is no 
corresponding notion to the justifications and exemptions provided for in the EU framework, rendering 
the WTO regime much stricter on one hand and creating the circumstances for potential conflicts between 
the two legal systems. 
 
ii. The Canada-Renewable Energy/FIT Case71 
 
Moreover, the recent case law of the WTO’s Appellate body has been extremely interesting 
with regards to the possible interaction and the potential conflict and convergence between EU State Aid 
law and the WTO subsidies regime, as the Altmark logic seems to have penetrated the WTO’s Dispute 
Settlement bodies. 
In particular, the case arose after the granting of FIT to renewable energy producers by Canada 
and the following dispute that was brought before the Panel of the WTO by several other WTO members, 
inter alia the EU. Japan filed a claim that a prohibited subsidy is granted under the measures because it 
appears to be provided, namely contingent upon the use of equipment for renewable energy generation 
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facilities produced in Ontario over imported equipment. It has been held that The Appellate Body in this 
case  has been indeed mainly influenced by the Altmark case and the EU’s justification logic for certain 
sensitive industries and policies. In particular, it held that “ Alternatively, such benchmark may also be 
found in price-discovery mechanisms such as competitive bidding or negotiated prices, which ensure that 
the price paid by the government is the lowest possible price offered by a willing supply contractor.”72 . 
Thus, it introduced public procurement notions of competitive bidding and lowest possible cost to the 
government, under the Altmark model, despite the fact that in the WTO regime the requirement of “cost 
to the government” as analyzed earlier. Also, the Appellate Body held that market creation could amount 
to a subsidy under certain circumstances but certainly, not automatically. Thus, a contrario in case such 
special circumstances are not found, then there is no subsidy. Thus, according to scholars this is actually 
considered as “a ‘carve-out’, ‘exception’ or ‘exclusion’ of certain types of action from subsidy laws.”73 
However, another interesting question could arise in the context of renewable energy, namely, 
whether an expansionist application of the justification provided by XX of the GATT would be possible 
to constitute a justification for a subsidy, under the same spirit as the justifications provided by EU law. 
However, such a proposal should be thoroughly considered.
74
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Analyzing the aforementioned, one realizes that all those exemptions relate to EU’s equal 
development and growth. Thus, they do not constitute economic advantages that actually render an 
advantage to certain undertakings but rather assist certain undertakings to act in favor of certain 
population or disadvantaged region. Thus, they do not create distortion but balance in the internal market.  
 
F. A Brief Comparison on the Procedural Regime and Remedies.  
1. EU State Aid : Prior notification, stand still obligation and the Recovery Remedy 
In the EU legal system, the main monitoring body on the granting of aids is the EU 
Commission. According to Article 108(3) TFEU
75
, where the procedural framework of EU State Aid is 
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provided for, new Aid measures are subject to prior notification by the member states to the Commission 
that has the authority to make comments or modify the planned State Aid program. The other major 
obligation of the State parallel to prior notification is the ‘stand still’ obligation, whereby the State cannot 
proceed with the actual granting of the Aid, until the latter has been approved by the Commission. Both 
obligations constitute the legal prerequisite in order for the State Aid program to be legally performed. 
Otherwise, the measure is considered as Unlawful Aid, i.e, procedurally unlawful.
76
 Moreover, the 
unlawfulness of the Aid cannot be cured simply by the fact that the Commission has found it to be 
compatible with the market. Thus, it is underlined that the notions of lawful and compatible State Aid are 
completely different and should not be confused. The ratio behind this distinction and especially the fact 
that the procedural unlawfulness remains despite the compatibility of the measure with the internal 
market, is to be found on the purpose of the ‘notification’ and ‘stand still’ obligations. They have been 
envisaged to safeguard the effectiveness of the remedies that would be jeopardized in case the 
aforementioned obligations were breached and then cured by the finding of compatible State Aid. 
However, a General Block Exemption Regulation (GBRE), entered into force, a new 
procedural regime was introduced that derived from the State Aid Action Plan, inaugurated in 2005. 
Specifically, the GBER envisages the absence of such an obligation to notify the granting of an aid in 
case the granting of an aid fell under those provisions
77
. The same applies also to de minimis aid that does 
not exceed €200,000 per undertaking over any period of 3 fiscal years (€100,000 in the road transport 
sector) or aid granted under an aid that has been approved by the Commission
78
. 
The prior notification obligation is followed by the stand still obligation
79
, according to which, 
the member state needs to abstain from the granting of the aid until the conduct of the preliminary 
investigation and the delivery of a decision on whether the notified aid is also compatible with EU law 
and can indeed be granted or whether there are serious grounds on that and further (formal) investigation 
is an order. In the latter case, where compatibility is doubted, the stand still obligation is extended until 
the delivery of the final decision. That final decision can be either positive, conditional, i.e, it permits the 
granting of the aid under certain conditions and finally, negative, i.e finding the aid granted as 
incompatible with EU law. 
As deriving from the above, unlawful aid is the aid that has been granted without the prior 
authorization of the EU Commission that constitutes the monitoring body of State Aid. It is actually the 
breach of the notification obligation and more closely related to procedural faults rather than substance, 
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that is more related to the notion of compatibility with EU law, as analyzed in the precious chapter. 
Therefore, it is capable of resulting in recovery of the aid only in case the latter has also been found to be 
incompatible with EU law, meaning that in case the aid is unlawful but compatible, no recovery is 
imposed. However, if the formal investigation results in a negative decision regarding the compatibility of 
the aid, then the Commission requires the Member State to recover the aid with interest from the 
beneficiary, except when such recovery would be contrary to a general principle of EU law. Still, judicial 
review of the decision is admissible before the CJEU. Simultaneously, If the State concerned does not 
comply with this decision within the prescribed time, the Commission or any other interested State may 
refer the matter to the Court of Justice of the European Union direct.  
 
2.WTO: Notification and the Tracks I,II  
In the WTO legal order, the main monitoring body is the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, where the states are reporting annually on the granting of subsidies. Thus, according to Article 
25.(1),(2) SCM
80
, there is also an obligation of notification regarding the granting of a subsidy, but 
substantially differentiated from the case in the EU regime, as the WTO notification is not an ex ante 
procedure. On the contrary, the WTO system includes only ex post procedures. Again, a preventive 
function of the notification obligation is evident. However, as in this legal order it is not the Organization 
that is empowered to commence investigations and remedies on subsidies that affect its industry, the 
members of the WTO undertake the obligation under Article 25.9, 25.10 SCM to notify to the Committee 
any investigation on countervailing measures. 
The remedies field, is the field where the most significant procedural differences are 
encountered between the two legal orders.   the WTO provides two different routes, i.e, the multilateral 
and the unilateral track. The former consists of the Dispute Settlement Understanding proceedings, where 
the outcome could even be the removal of the adverse effects of the subsidy or its withdrawal. In 
particular, any member can challenge the granting of a subsidy by another member, on the ground of a 
breach of the WTO subsidy regime. If a prohibited subsidy is found, then the decision will order its 
withdrawal, whereas, in cases of actionable subsidies, the decision will order the removal of adverse 
effects of the subsidy from the complainant’s economy81. The other route, i.e, the unilateral route, which 
is not even remotely provided for in EU law, includes the imposition of countervailing measures on the 
imported products, following a formal investigation and filing of a complaint by the importing state, 
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provided for in Part V SCM
82
.  Thus, today all subsidies, i.e, prohibited, actionable subsidies that are 
specific can be subject to countervailing measures, as long as a specific – in case of actionable - subsidy 
exists and is proven that there is a causal link between it and injury conferred to the importing state’s 
industry. However, there is a second option of unilateral measures, such as the retaliatory subsidies. 
Those are effectively subsidies granted by a state in order to put pressure on another state to withdraw its 
own subsidies.
83
  
 
3. Conclusion  
Thus, the conclusion of this brief chapter is that there are elaborate rules on WTO subsidies, 
notwithstanding the fact that they do not provide for many options for enforcement, but merely the 
countervailing measures and the dispute resolution system, where a member injured can request for the 
elimination of the subsidy. This  prima facie underdeveloped discipline of the subsidies regime is in fact 
much more elaborate and adequate than the State Aid regime, where the notion of countervailing 
measures has not been introduced and the only existing enforcement option is that of the elimination of 
the State Aid by the return of the amount granted to the recipient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concluding Remarks  
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The interaction between the WTO subsidies regime and the EU State Aid Rules definitely 
constitute a potential ground for conflict, as the differences in the logic, objectives and interpretation 
create the predicament, where similar notions and facts are interpreted and treated in quite different ways. 
These divergences that are capable of creating conflicts can arise at the definitional level but mainly at the 
methodological level of the analysis.  
The most prominent field of conflict is the justification disciplines included in the EU State 
Aid regime
84
. As already mentioned, the EU regime has incorporated several grounds for justifying the 
granting of subsidies by member- states that come in line with the other objectives and values of the 
internal market and especially of the EU. In this context, it is easily conceivable that State Aid that is 
included in a block exemption is considered lawful and compatible with the internal market and is 
perfectly functioning in the EU legal order. No procedural or substance issue can arise in this legal order, 
as any inconsistency of the measure with the general discipline of State Aid has been cured solely by the 
inclusion of the measure in one of the categories of the Block exemption or the special de minimis limits. 
Otherwise, the requirements for the existence of State Aid remain. Insofar as they resemble the premises 
for the affirmation of the existence of a subsidy under the WTO’s SCM Agreement’s rules, it is likely that 
this measure is indeed considered an actionable or prohibited subsidy. What is stated here is that, due to 
the broad spectrum of justifications provided by EU law and jurisprudence and the absolute absence of 
any justification for the WTO’s subsidies, there could be cases where a justified State Aid, is indeed a 
subsidy subject to either track I or track II remedies, i.e, counter-veiling measures or Dispute Settlement. 
The opposite scenario is almost inconceivable.  
Another scenario derives again from the justification discipline and in particular the Block 
exemption Regulation. As there has already been commented
85
 this broad scope of the Block exemption 
can also hide certain traps, especially the potential attempt of the States to violate the exemption by using 
these rules as a Trojan Horse for State Aid that should have be notified. In that case, it is even more likely 
to have cases of State Aid that States are trying to grant by tricking the EU Commission by trying to take 
advantage of the recently formed quite lenient exemption framework. However, up to this moment, there 
have been only limited cases where issues of conflict have arisen in the field of subsidies and State Aids. 
This situation is probably going to change very soon, as the subsidization of renewable energy that is 
ubiquitous in both legal orders, if not treated properly could signal the change of an era, especially since 
the decisions of the Panels and Appellate Body are sometimes not convincing, interpreting certain issues 
in a manner that creates precedents that are beneficial for both sides but could create problems in the 
future.  
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Despite having already spotted certain fields of conflict between the two legal orders, it should 
also be noted that some kind of interaction has already been noticed. In the context of the issue of 
resources and financial contribution, that constitutes a common requirement in both legal orders but has 
been differently interpreted, especially with regards to the issue of ‘cost to the government’. The EU case 
law expressly requires a cost to the government in order to accept the existence of State Aid, a position 
that certainly is narrower than the WTO’s, where no burden on the public account is necessary. However, 
this differentiation derives from the different views of the EC and US during the Uruguay Round and the 
EC’s effort to avoid the aggressive countervailing measures policy of the US. Thus, the European 
interpretation of the State resources and cost to government requirement was deliberately narrowed, and 
actually constituted one of the first instances of interaction between the two legal orders at a policy 
level.
86
 However, the risk of conflict between EU law and WTO law remains, as an aid granted in the EU 
without any cost to the government, may not constitute State Aid but can fall under the definition of 
subsidy under the SCM Agreement and thus, not avoid remedies. 
Another point of interaction between the two legal orders, gives rise to the question of whether 
one of the legal orders should abide by the rules of the other with regard to subsidies is a quite interesting 
one. It is mostly accepted that the EU State Aid regime is much more elaborate than the WTO subsidies 
regime, both in terms of legislation but also in terms of jurisprudence and integration. However, it should 
be mentioned that in the case of the GBER, the EU seems to follow the wording of the WTO in a certain 
degree. This statement is in a way misleading, taking into consideration that with the abolition of green 
subsidies, the WTO regime lacks any mention of justification. 
In particular, as already mentioned in the previous chapter, Regulation 651/2014 expressly 
leaves out of its scope export State Aid. In particular, according to Art 1(2)(c) “This Regulation shall not 
apply to: (c) aid to export-related activities towards third countries or Member States, namely aid 
directly linked to the quantities exported, to the establishment and operation of a distribution network or 
to other current costs linked to the export activity;” and according to Art 1(2)(d) “aid contingent upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods.”87 This wording is almost identical to the SCM Agreement’s 
wording of Article 3, i.e the provision of the prohibited subsidies, which quotes “Except as provided in 
the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be 
prohibited: (a) subsidies contingent, in law or in fact4 , whether solely or as one of several other 
conditions, upon export performance, including those illustrated in Annex I5 ; (b) subsidies contingent, 
whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods.”88 
This observation gives rise to some interesting thoughts, as the EU regime seems to introduce all 
these detailed rules on exemptions from the notification requirement but has also stipulated the import 
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and export related activities, which also constitute the ‘red light’ subsidies under the WTO regime. Thus, 
despite what someone would expect, it is the elaborate EU State Aid law system that has been influenced 
and not the other way.  
At a legal level, it has been observed in practice that EU member-states have invoked the 
WTO rules and interpretation as defense before either the General Court or the Commission. 
Nevertheless, such arguments have not been successful, as the direct effect of WTO law into the EU legal 
order has been vigorously denied
89
 However, the general question of the relationship between EU law and 
WTO remains, in the context of the former’s relation to International law. The Court decided, that the 
GATT should not have direct effect.
90
 Thus, a challenge of an EC measure on the basis of the GATT 
would not be admissible, as the Court held that escape clauses, too many exceptions to the GATT.
91
  
However, case law that was developed after the formation of the WTO revealed that the actual reason for 
this choice was the absence of reciprocity, as the rest of the members of the WTO, and trading partners 
(and competitors) did not attribute either direct effect to WTO legislation.
92
 The denial of direct effect has 
been since the rule for the case law, apart from the Biret case
93
, where it was held that the WTO dispute 
settlement bodies’s decisions should not be completely overlooked.94 
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